Introduction. 
Le 6 août 2009, quelques jours après le verdict contre les 35 accusés dans le procès Belliraj, l’ambassade américaine à Rabat a envoyé un commentaire secret à Washington et à différentes ambassades américaines en Europe, sous le titre « Un important cas de terrorisme soulève des questions de droits de l’Homme » Cette note, qu’on a pu découvrir grâce à Wikileaks et qui est publiée sur le site du journal libanais Al-Akhbar et reproduite ci-dessous, confirme et souscrit, mot pour mot, aux principaux arguments et critiques des Associations des Droits de l’Homme contre ce procès. Rien d’étonnant qu’après sa publication, l’administration belge n’a pas voulu réagir au contenu de cette note américaine: elle est non seulement un coup dur pour le Maroc de la part de son principal allié, mais elle met aussi en cause le rôle joué par la Belgique. La Belgique a activement collaboré à ce procès en transférant des documents et des dossiers permettant l’inculpation des accusés. Fait déjà dénoncé par le sénateur CD&V et professeur en droit Hugo Vandenberghe, lors de la session plenière du Sénat le 4 mars 2009, comme « une violation de l’article 6 de la Convention européenne si la Belgique n’a pas de garantie que le procès va se dérouler de manière équitable et impartiale ». Pire. Il y a 1 semaine, le 29 novembre, le ministre des affaires étrangères Vanackere déclarait fièrement en réponse à l’interpellation de Zoe Genot : « Enfin, vous avez dit que « la Belgique a refusé toute extradition dans le cadre du dossier Belirej ». En réalité, début 2010, le SPF Justice a autorisé l’extradition d’un ressortissant algérien dans le cadre de ce dossier ».Or, la note américaine confirme que le procès était bel et bien inéquitable. Et de ce fait que la Belgique est complice d’une opération illégale.
Dans sa note, l’ambassadeur américain attache avant tout de l’importance à la présence et à la condamnation des « six hommes politiques » parmi les 35 accusés. Sur ce point, il cite l’avocat de la défense Abdelaziz Nouyidi, qui affirme que le procès était un avertissement « aux Islamistes de rester dans les limites établies par le Roi » et qu’ « au Maroc une alliance éventuelle entre la gauche et les petits partis islamistes pour les élections ne serait pas acceptable ».
Mais la note américaine s’en prend aussi à l’ensemble de ce procès : « Selon des organisations de défense des droits humains, les avocats de la défense et les diplomates européens au courant de l’affaire, les preuves contre tous les accusés ne se basaient que sur les déclarations des prévenus à la police, dans lesquelles ils s’accusaient eux-mêmes et d’autres personnes. Et sur deux saisies d’armes, qui auraient été destinées à être utilisées pour commettre des assassinats et autres actes terroristes. Les prévenus ont d’abord confirmé leurs dépositions devant le juge dinstruction, mais se sont ensuite rétractés devant le juge de première instance, disant qu’elles avaient été obtenues sous la contrainte ou avaient été modifiées. ».
A noter aussi, la mention dans cette note, du suivi très proche et de la critique très sévère de ce procès par des diplomates belges au Maroc. L’ambassadeur américain cite ‘Daniel Bernard, adviseur de droit belge auprès du gouvernement marocain’, et ‘Johan Jacobs, conseiller à l’ambassade belge’, qui, tous les deux, dénoncent ce procès. Monsieur Jacobs a declaré que les condamnations dans ce procès étaient tout simplement « décidées à l’avance ».
On se demande si, après la publication de cette note, le gouvernement belge, et le ministre Vanackere en particulier, pourront maintenir leur attitude honteuse de refuser toute intervention et toute assistance au Belge Ali Aarrass, détenu en Espagne, et dont l’extradition est uniquement demandée par le Maroc dans le cadre de ce même procès.
Luk Vervaet
09RABAT679 Date06/08/2009 07:14 OriginEmbassy Rabat
Excerpt from document
(C) Summary: On July 28, a Sale court sentenced
Moroccan-Belgian Abdelkader Belleraj to life in prison
(instead of the death penalty requested by prosecutors) for
running an international terrorist network. The 34 other
defendants on trial with Belleraj received sentences ranging
from one to 30 years.
Full Document
ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRB #0679/01 2181914
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 061914Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0538
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3210
RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 0115
Content
S E C R E T RABAT 000679
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR S/CT, NEA/MAG AND DRL/NESCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2019
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PTER, KISL, MO
SUBJECT: LANDMARK TERRORISM CASE RAISES HUMAN RIGHTS
QUESTIONS
REF: A. 08 RABAT 0311 (NOTAL)
B. 08 RABAT 0178 (NOTAL)
C. 08 RABAT 0222 (NOTAL)
D. RABAT 0543 (NOTAL)
Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: On July 28, a Sale court sentenced
Moroccan-Belgian Abdelkader Belleraj to life in prison
(instead of the death penalty requested by prosecutors) for
running an international terrorist network. The 34 other
defendants on trial with Belleraj received sentences ranging
from one to 30 years. While Belleraj and some of his
associates undoubtedly had links to terrorism, the link is
much less clear for six Islamist politicians, who received
sentences ranging from two to 25 years. These six
politicians have come to be known in the public and the press
as « political detainees » because of allegations that they
were arrested for their political affiliation rather than any
real connection to terrorist acts. Human rights activists
monitoring this case have condemned the trial and the
verdict. A family member of one of the politicians sentenced
to 20 years called the trial a « farce » and wondered, in the
context of celebrations of King Mohammed VI’s ten years of
rule, « How can this be possible in the new Morocco? » End
Summary.
———-
Background
———-
2. (C) In February 2008, Minister of the Interior Chakib
Benmoussa publicly announced the dismantling of a dangerous
terrorist network, masterminded by Moroccan-Belgian
Abdelkader Belleraj. Belleraj was arrested for possessing an
arsenal of firearms, allegedly to be used to assassinate
Moroccan ministers, members of the military, and Jewish
citizens. He is suspected of having committed at least six
assassinations in Europe, as well as conducting arms
trafficking, money laundering, robberies and other crimes
(Ref A). The 34 other men arrested in connection with the
network were charged with crimes such as « disturbing the
national security of the State » and « conspiracy to plot and
carry out terrorist acts, » the highest crimes under Moroccan
terrorism laws.
——————-
The Six Politicians
——————-
3. (C) While there is little doubt that Belleraj and some of
his associates have committed grave crimes, the public and
media have labeled six of the defendants « political
detainees » because of allegations that they were arrested for
their political affiliation rather than for having any real
connection to terrorist actions or intentions. While the
Embassy and other diplomatic missions do not dispute the
prima facie threat from Belleraj, who has a long history of
relations with Islamic radicals from Ayatollah Khomeini to
Osama bin Laden, there appears to be little evidence that the
six politicians had any involvement in planning terrorist
acts. Nevertheless, the GOM persisted in trying all of the
accused together under the anti-terrorism laws enacted after
the May 2003 suicide attacks in Casablanca, dismissing
repeated attempts by lawyers to separate the trials of the
six from the larger group. As a result, the politicians were
charged, like the other members of the group, with
involvement in terrorist activity, including plotting against
the regime, being a member of an armed group with the
objective of destabilizing the nation, and threatening public
safety — among the most severe crimes under Morocco’s
terrorism laws.
4. (U) Five of the politicians affiliated with
Islamist-inspired political parties at the time of their
arrest were sentenced to 20 and 25 years in prison.
Maelainin Laabadla, a Sahrawi member of the national council
of the Islamist-inspired Party of Justice and Development
(PJD), headed the PJD’s commission on the Western Sahara;
Mustafa Moatassim served as Secretary General of the
Civilized Alternative (Al Badil Al Hadari), a small,
Islamist-inspired political party which was disbanded two
days after his arrest; Mohamed Marouani and Amine Regala had
been, respectively, the Secretary General and party
spokesperson of the unauthorized party of the Nation (Al
Oumma), an Islamist organization that had been seeking party
status; and Abdelhafid Sriti worked as a television
correspondent for Hezbollah’s Al Manar.
5. (SBU) The sixth politician, Hamid Najibi, a member of the
national council of the Unified Socialist Party (PSU), and
the only politician not affiliated with an Islamist party,
received a suspended sentence of two years. International
reaction to the heavy sentences of the politicians has been
mostly shock, especially given the skepticism increasingly
voiced by the press and public regarding the case.
—————————
Political Links to Belleraj
—————————
6. (C) In the early 1990’s, under the reign of King Hassan
II, at least four of the six politicians belonged to an
organization called Islamic Choice, an Islamic cultural and
political organization. For ideological reasons, Islamic
Choice eventually dissolved and then split into two smaller
Islamist political parties, the Civilized Alternative and the
Nation. According to Moroccan government officials, Belleraj
and his co-conspirators hoped to use these parties as the
foundation of a new political wing of their network, and
then, under the guise of political activity, use them to
destabilize Morocco (Ref B).
7. (C) At the time of the arrests, the Civilized Alternative
had been formally recognized by the GOM, and, according to
Sidi Ali Maelainin, the brother of Mr. Laabadla, had been
encouraged as an alternative to the Islamist-inspired PJD,
until the terrorist network was uncovered. The Nation had
applied for and was awaiting approval as a political
organization at the time of the arrests in February 2008.
Because it had not yet received an official refusal, it was
on the verge of becoming a party by default, Maelainin said.
He speculated that the GOM opposed the recognition of the
Nation because it could open the way for Sheik Yassine’s
Islamist Justice and Good Works Organization (al-Adl wa
al-Ihsan or AWI) to enter politics — a move strongly opposed
by the Palace.
——————–
A Message to the PJD
——————–
8. (C) Relatives of the politicians, and increasingly the
press, suggest that the arrest of the six political
defendants was designed to deter the proliferation of
Islamist politicians and political parties, rather than
terrorist acts. As reported, shortly after the arrests of
the six politicians, even the PJD acknowledged that the
arrests may have been intended as a message to stay in line
(Ref C). The PJD has denounced the verdicts against the
politicians, suggesting that such punishments evoke the
authoritarian reign of Hassan II and the &Years of Lead.8
9. (C) According to Abdelaziz Nouyidi, a prominent human
rights attorney and member of the defense team, the arrest
and trial of Islamist political figures was timed to send a
clear message to the political parties in the lead up to the
June 2009 local elections. « The Palace wanted to remind the
Islamists to stay within the bounds established by the King, »
he said, continuing that an alliance between the PJD and the
left would not be welcome. Nouyidi speculated that the
inclusion among the defendants of Hamid Najibi of the Unified
Socialist Party signaled the Palace’s displeasure at the
prospect of such an alliance.
—————————
Evidence and Irregularities
—————————
10. (C) According to human rights NGOs, defense attorneys
and European diplomats familiar with the case, the state’s
evidence against all 35 of the accused consisted of the
defendants’ statements to the police in which they implicate
themselves and others, and two seizures of weapons which were
allegedly intended to be used to conduct assassinations and
other terrorist acts. The defendants initially affirmed
their statements before a preliminary judge, but then
retracted them before the trial judge, saying they had been
obtained under duress or had been altered.
11. (S/NF) The judge’s written decision on the case has not
yet been made available, and it is, therefore, not clear
what, if any, other evidence the GOM may have against the
accused. The Moroccan Government provided to the Regional
Affairs Office photographs of the seized weapons which
included guns, ammunition, silencers, and balaclavas.
Despite repeated requests, the GOM did not provide
satisfactory evidence to the Mission of a connection between
the politicians and the terrorist network. Daniel Bernard,
Belgian Legal Advisor to the Government of Morocco, who has
closely followed this case, speculated, « Maybe there is
something behind the accusations » of the six politicians, but
if so, the Moroccan Government has not divulged it to anyone.
12. (C) Calling the trial and prosecution of his brother « a
farce, » Sidi Ali Maelainin outlined for PolOff other
irregularities in the case. The judge had repeatedly refused
to allow the defense access to files, to call witnesses or to
introduce evidence, he said, accusations confirmed by
Bernard. In addition, nearly all the defendants alleged that
their statements had been altered by the police. The Charge
raised these concerns in his June 24 meeting with Human
Rights Council Chairman Ahmed Herzenni, who acknowledged the
irregularities and promised to review the trial following
delivery of the verdict (Ref D).
————-
No Fair Trial
————-
13. (C) Calling the trial « pre-cooked, » Johan Jacobs,
Counselor at the Belgian Embassy, said there is « no doubt »
the trial was unfair. Not a single person had been
acquitted, he observed, an unlikely outcome given the large
number of defendants. He also questioned how an impartial
judge could reach a verdict and determine sentences for 35
different individuals less than 12 hours after the closing
arguments. He told PolOff that some of the evidence used in
the trial had been provided by Belgium and was written in
French and Dutch. Even though the evidence provided by
Brussels was accurate and, in some cases damning, Jacobs
wondered how the trial could be fair if neither the defense
nor the prosecution could understand it. When the defense
requested to have the files translated into Arabic, the court
ruled that only parts of the files could be translated,
orally, during court proceedings. This is a peculiar way of
honoring a defendant’s right to know the evidence against
him, he said, adding, « Some of these guys have real proof
against them, but that does not change the fact that the
trial was unfair. » Sidi Ali Maelainin called the lack of a
fair trial « frightening. » In the context of national
celebration of the reforms initiated by King Mohammed VI over
the last ten years, he wondered, « How can this be possible in
the new Morocco? »
——-
Comment
——-
14. (C) The GOM,s heavy-handed approach taken by the GOM in
this case illustrates Morocco’s willingness to use its
counterterrorism laws to marginalize Islamist-inspired
political activities. The nearly universal belief that the
verdict of this trial was predetermined by the Ministry of
the Interior — a not unlikely scenario — highlights the
lack of trust many Moroccans have in the justice system.
Equally troubling for Morocco’s governance reform outlook is
the plausible prospect that at least six defendants were
tried and convicted for political reasons unrelated to
zealous counter-terrorism objectives. If true, this would
represent a manipulation of the courts not only for security
goals but also to affect legitimate political activity — a
step backward in the political and democratic progress the
Kingdom has realized in the past decade. Although the GOM
has made great progress in respecting human rights under King
Mohammed VI, there is still room for improvement,
particularly in respecting non-establishment viewpoints. End
Comment.
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Jackson
